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Coordination Modes and Client-Supplier Relationship Performance: The 
Moderating Effect of Collaborative Risks
Abstract  
Boundary spanner relational skills are considered critical in the successful management of buyer–
supplier relationships and may help avoiding high costs of more formal inter-organizational controls. 
Yet, the influence of partners’ boundary spanners on effective supply chain collaboration has had 
much less inquiry than the influence of broader inter-organizational controls. We use survey data of 
200 buyer–supplier relationships to examine how these individual and organizational control 
mechanisms influence the performance effects of interfirm collaborations that vary in scope of 
activities undertaken. Findings show that collaborative scope as well as boundary spanner relational 
skills and inter-organizational controls are positively associated with performance. The effect of 
collaborative scope on firm performance, however, also depends on both mechanisms but in opposite 
directions: while the influence of collaborative scope on performance is enhanced by inter-
organizational controls, a partner’s boundary spanner relational skills has a negative moderating effect, 
indicating that such skills contribute more to the effective management of collaborations of narrow 
scope than those of broader scope. 
Keywords: buyer–supplier relations, boundary spanners, relational skills, inter-organizational control, 
collaboration scope, firm performance 
 Carole Donada  Caroline Mothe  Gwenaelle Nogatchewsky 
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1. Introduction
In buyer–supplier collaborations, firms use inter-organizational and relational controls to address
cooperation and coordination concerns in order to enhance collaborative and firm performance 
(Anderson, Christ, Dekker, & Sedatole, 2015). Inter-organizational controls are chosen and 
implemented at the firm level. They include formal mechanisms such as contracts, organizational 
structures, target setting, and feedback or performance management systems (Anderson et al., 2015; 
Dekker, 2004; Huang, Cheng, & Tseng, 2014; Mahama, 2006), and their goal is to enhance the 
likelihood of achieving objectives through collaboration and thereby fostering performance. Relational 
controls refer to the extent to which exchanges are governed by social relations, informal structures, 
and self-enforcement (Cao & Lumineau, 2015). Contrary to formal mechanisms, relational controls are 
not directly chosen, designed or implemented. They are built step by step during repeated exchanges. 
Trust and relational norms (e.g., flexibility, solidarity, information exchange) are two main relational 
control mechanisms discussed in the literature (Liu, Luo, & Liu, 2009; Szczepański & Światowiec-
Szczpańska, 2012). Some foundational level trust and relational norms, for instance based on 
reputation or past experiences, is considered necessary to initiate a new collaboration. But both trust 
and norms mainly develop through social ties among individuals, which emerge and grow during 
collaborations (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998).  
Although most of the process relies on individuals, scholars usually adopt an organizational level 
of analysis to examine relational controls (Dong, Zhenzhong, & Zhou, 2017). Such an organizational 
level provides an aggregate view of relational controls across groups of individuals that reflect an 
organizational view and are assumed to collectively hold certain levels of trust and relational norms. 
This can lead to ambiguous results (Zhang, Wu, & Henke, 2011), all the more because the way that 
inter-individual trust and shared norms transfer to the organization is far from self-evident (Tangpong, 
Hung, & Ro, 2010; Zaheer et al., 1998). In this paper, we examine how firms’ reliance on inter-
organizational and relational controls is associated with the performance effects derived from supply 
chain collaboration. In examining the influence of relational controls, we particularly focus on the role 
of boundary spanners who are the individuals in charge of inter-organizational relationships (Zhang et 
al., 2011). Boundary spanners are critical for managing interfirm collaboration. Through repeated 
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interactions, they come to share representations and information, manage conflicts, solve joint 
problems, develop knowledge, and so forth (e.g. Tangpong et al., 2010). To perform these functions, 
boundary spanners need strong relational skills, including traits such as being frank, honest, open, 
available, adaptable, likeable, agreeable, fair, polite, proactive, tolerant, compassionate, benevolent, 
and even having a sense of humor (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Jap, 1999; Lussier, Grégoire, & Vachon, 
2017; Tangpong et al., 2010; Walter, 1999). Although these individual qualities seem crucial for 
effective collaboration, prior research on inter-organizational control has predominantly focused on 
control choices and relational controls at the firm level, largely ignoring the effects of boundary 
spanners’ relational skills (Dekker, 2016). By integrating this firm-level perspective on controls with a 
lower level of analysis, as suggested by Tangpong et al. (2010), the current study takes the relational 
skills of partners’ boundary spanners into account in the success of collaboration. We particularly 
focus on relational skills of partner firms’ boundary spanners, who are at the basis of developing 
relational controls with the partner firm, and on inter-organizational controls employed during the 
relationship (i.e., the setting of targets, evaluation of achievements, and feedback and follow-up 
meetings).1 The underlying assumption is that partners’ relational skills influence the need for control 
and that trusting a partner’s boundary spanners can offset the costs of implementing more formal inter-
organizational controls. The key objective of this study is to examine these interrelations between 
boundary spanner relational skills and inter-organizational control and their influence on performance. 
In examining these influences, we consider the effects of a critical relationship characteristic, 
namely its scope in terms of breath and depth of activities undertaken in the collaboration (Mishra, 
Chandrasekran, & MacCormack, 2015). Broad collaborations cover several activities across the value 
chain, and depth reflects the intensity of collaboration on those activities. Prior research suggests that 
collaborations with a greater scope have a greater potential to influence firm performance (Smith, 
Callagher, & Huang, 2014), are of greater strategic importance (Reuer & Arino 2007), but also entail a 
greater need for control (Dekker, Ding, & Groot, 2016). The most intensive collaborations with the 
                                                 
1 We note that boundary spanners involved in managing a relationship are often not the same individuals who 
were involved in initiating, negotiation and (contractually) establishing a relationship. Similarly, the inter-
organizational controls that we study are broader than those contractually established at the outset of a 
relationship and involve practices employed during the relationship (e.g., not only target setting that may be part 
of the contract but also meetings to evaluate performance, provide feedback and discuss progress).  
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greatest control requirements thus are those where partners collaborate deeply on a wide range of 
activities. We accordingly examine whether the performance effects of collaboration scope vary with 
boundary spanners’ relational skills and use of inter-organizational controls, both individually and in 
combination. By testing the moderating effects of both individual and inter-organizational forms of 
control across relationships of varying scope, we fill a gap in extant research on the value of these 
controls across different settings. Particularly, we aim to contribute the academic literature on the 
management of interfirm collaboration by reconciling two streams of research on both inter-
organizational and individual-level controls, and exploring a key condition that determines their 
relative value in effectively managing interfirm relationships. Our research is also important to 
practice as it provides insights to managers regarding how and when in their supply chain relationships 
they can apply organizational mechanisms or rely on key boundary spanners to enhance performance.  
To test our expectations, we collect survey data from 200 French firms about their relationship 
with a supply chain partner. Data analysis confirms that collaboration scope relates positively to firm 
performance, but also that this influence depends on the relational skills of supply chain partners’ 
boundary spanners and on the inter-organizational controls in place. Boundary spanners’ relational 
skills have a positive direct effect on firm performance, but negatively moderate the effect of 
collaboration scope. In contrast, inter-organizational controls have positive direct and moderating 
effects on firm performance. We find no evidence of additional interaction effects between boundary 
spanners’ relational skills and inter-organizational controls, suggesting that the identified moderating 
effects on performance are additive. These results thus indicate that the relational skills of supply 
chain partners’ boundary spanners are particularly valuable in narrow scope collaboration. However, 
this positive impact is reduced when collaboration scope increases. Indeed, a broader scope may 
generate additional much complexity that individuals may not be able to manage effectively. In such 
settings of increasing collaboration scope, inter-organizational controls thus appear to be relatively 
more beneficial for collaboration. 
This study aims to extend our understanding of control in supply chains in three main ways. First, 
we highlight the prominent role of boundary spanners in interfirm collaboration and recognize that 
they are keystones of developing relational controls. As we demonstrate, effective reliance on business 
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partners’ boundary spanners depends on the scope of the collaboration. Second, by moving beyond a 
perspective that views interfirm control as either organizational or individual, we show how both inter-
organizational controls and individual-level relational controls are implied in the management of 
supply chain relationships. Third, rather than analyzing when different modes of control interact (see 
Cao & Lumineau, 2015), we consider the collaborative scope to capture heterogeneity in firm–partner 
collaborative efforts across value chain activities, such that we can assess the performance 
implications of collaboration scope and both the relative and joint influence of different types of 
controls. 
 
2. Conceptual background 
2.1. Inter-organizational controls and boundary spanners’ relational skills: a mixed-level model 
Two control issues characterize buyer–supplier collaboration: appropriation concerns and 
coordination requirements (Dekker, 2004). Appropriation concerns result from the divergence of 
interests between parties that may lead them to engage in opportunistic behavior or free-ride instead of 
to cooperate (Liu et al., 2009). Parties are uncertain whether their expectations will be achieved, 
whether the partner will act in the interest of the collaboration, and whether the value of the 
collaboration will be fairly distributed. Coordination requirements result instead from the risk of non-
alignment across collaborative activities. The activities of each partner must be coherent to achieve the 
desired outcomes. To minimize risks associated with these requirements and create favorable 
collaborative conditions, firms rely on various controls, which can be broadly classified into two 
categories: inter-organizational controls and relational controls. The bulk of the literature has 
emphasized a firm-level analysis and organizational mechanisms (e.g., Cao & Lumineau, 2015), 
instead of a relational governance perspective integrating the individual level. We here adopt such an 
approach to understand how firms can rely on relational controls in the management of a relationship. 
Inter-organizational controls include all the formal mechanisms designed and implemented by an 
organization to deal with appropriation concerns and coordination requirements. Studies adopting a 
transactional perspective have typically examined the use of specific investments and formal contracts 
(Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013). We adopt a broader perspective rooted in organizational control 
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theory (Bedford, Malmi, & Sandelin, 2016; Malmi & Brown, 2008) suggesting that organizational 
control mechanisms consist of all devices that are used to ensure that behaviors and decisions are 
consistent with the organization’s objectives. In Malmi and Brown’s (2008) framework, they include 
governance and organizational structures, policies and rules, planning, measurement and rewards 
systems. In the same mindset, inter-organizational controls include organizational mechanisms that 
enable to achieve control in exchange relationships such as through joint targets, operational reviews, 
feedback mechanisms, and dedicated collaborative practices (e.g., joint training, shared seminars). For 
instance, collaborating supply chain partners may agree on targets for cost reduction, quality 
enhancement and reliability, put in place practices to monitor and discuss achievements on activities 
and their outcomes, and organize joint training sessions and seminars to exchange knowledge, enhance 
skills and socialize. In combination or separately, these mechanisms can reduce control issues and 
create conditions for effective supply chain relationships (Dekker, 2004; Lumineau & Henderson, 
2012). Prior studies of inter-organizational controls often address the initial phases of collaboration 
and ex ante formal mechanisms, such as the partner selection process and contract design that can 
reduce transactional risks (e.g., Liu et al., 2009). Yet, risks and challenges identified in the initial 
phase may persist, placing demands on control means also after the contract is settled. Quantitative 
analyses of post-contractual controls are less common, however, and studies that include the effects of 
such controls on performance are even fewer (Dekker et al., 2013, 2016; Wacker, Yang, & Sheu, 
2016). To fill this gap, we adopt an organizational perspective on control and consider organizational 
mechanisms used during the management of the collaboration. 
Relational controls, often considered from a perspective anchored in social and relational 
exchange theory (Cao & Lumineau, 2015), mainly involve trust and relational norms (Liu et al., 2009), 
which are mutually connected (Szczepanski & Światowiec-Szczpańska, 2012). Both trust and 
relational norms relate to informal cultures and systems and derive from repeated interactions between 
individuals, face-to-face discussions, shared ideas, personal initiatives, closeness, liking, and, more 
generally, socially embedded relationships that constitute the social capital of firms (Cao & Lumineau, 
2015; Carey, Lawson, & Krause, 2011; Ferguson, Paulin, & Bergeron, 2005; Nicholson, Compeau, & 
Sehti, 2001). Relational controls depend therefore critically on individuals’ abilities to interact, 
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personal qualities, social connections, and personal initiatives (Dong et al., 2017; Li, Xie, & Teo, 
2010; Liu et al., 2009).2 In many studies, the characteristics of relational controls are attributed to 
firms, while in essence they come from individuals who act on behalf of their firm. This resulting 
cross-level issue has been viewed as potential threat to the validity of the findings of studies 
(Tangpong et al. 2010). This has also led to calls for studies that examine how individuals affect the 
collaboration and its firm-level outcomes (Cai, Jun & Yang, 2017; Dekker, 2016; Hohenschwert & 
Geiger, 2015; Zhang et al., 2011). Numerous studies have already considered critical characteristics of 
the individuals involved in interfirm relationships, in particular in marketing and supply chain 
management (e.g. Cai et al., 2017; Carr & Smeltzer, 2000; Crosby, Evans & Cowles, 1990; Doney & 
Cannon, 1997; Eltantawy, Giunipero & Fox, 2009; Giunipero, Denslow & Eltantawy, 2005; Giunipero 
& Pearcy, 2000; Grawe, Daugherty, & Ralston, 2015; Palmatier, Scheer & Steenkamp, 2007). We 
focus here on the relational skills of a partner firm’s boundary spanners who are assigned by their firm 
to manage exchanges with the external environment—mainly other organizations. Relational skills are 
skills, namely abilities gained by practice and knowledge (Carr & Smeltzer, 2000) that through their 
deployment create and shape positive relationships between boundary spanners (Walter, 1999). They 
are interpersonal skills signaling the predisposition of an individual boundary spanner to be likable, to 
behave in a tolerant, empathetic, supportive, compassionate, and loyal way (Borg & Johnston, 2013; 
Doney & Cannon, 1997; Giunipero & Pearcy, 2000; Palmatier et al., 2007; Tangpong et al., 2010). 
They are also communication skills (Borg & Johnston, 2013; Carr & Smeltzer, 2000; Giunipero & 
Pearcy, 2000; Zhang, Wu, & Henke, 2015), behavioral skills such as the ability to work in a team, to 
follow-up, to be flexible, and proactive (Carr & Smeltzer, 2000; Giunipero & Pearcy, 2000), and more 
broadly management skills such as the abilities to behave ethically, listen, communicate effectively, 
and be creative in problem solving (Monczka, Handfield, Giunipero & Patterson, 2016). These 
relational skills can be considered strategic so long they play an integrative role in designing and 
implementing the firm’s strategic plan towards its partners (Eltantawy et al. 2009). In cooperative 
contexts, boundary spanners’ relational skills facilitate communication, support joint problem solving, 
                                                 
2 Dong et al. (2017), for instance, examine interpersonal quanxi in Chinese B2B relationships as determinants of 
relational governance between firms. 
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resolve conflicts harmoniously, foster benevolence, commitment and long-term orientation, better 
relationship quality, reduce opportunism and ultimately can enhance collaborative and firm 
performance (Crosby et al., 1990; Eltantawy et al., 2009; Grawe et al., 2015; Tangpong et al., 2010; 
Zhang et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2015). 
We focus particularly on the relational skills of business partners’ boundary spanners as basis of 
the focal firm’s reliance on relational control. Their deployment of relational skills should send a 
positive signal to the focal firm’s boundary spanners that control problems are alleviated. Similar to 
the idea that relying on trust can provide a low cost control solution, relying on the relational behavior 
of a partner’s boundary spanners could be a low cost and nonetheless effective control solution. Not 
only relying on boundary spanners with well-developed relational skills is efficient, as compared to 
costly formal control mechanisms (Li et al., 2010), but it might also prevent from endangering the 
quality of the relationship by imposing more formal organizational controls (such as based on 
performance expectations and evaluations).  
Considering the costs and diversity of control mechanisms available to managers, a critical 
question is when firms rely on boundary spanners’ relational skills and on inter-organizational controls 
to effectively manage collaborative relationships. In the next section we argue that collaboration scope 
determines the need for different controls in order to realize potential cooperative benefits. 
 
2.2 Collaboration scope 
Any decision about relying on inter-organizational controls or on boundary spanners’ relational 
skills must be made in accordance with the characteristics of the collaboration that generate a demand 
for control (Anderson et al., 2015; Cai et al., 2017; Giunipero et al., 2005). Collaboration scope is a 
key characteristic for buyer–supplier relationships that determines collaboration structure and need for 
supply chain integration (Leuschner, Rogers & Charvet, 2013; Mishra et al., 2015), and particularly 
the coordination and appropriation challenges to be managed (Dekker et al., 2016). Broader scope 
collaboration provides firms with greater potential to extract benefits from their collaborative 
relationships, but also expose them to greater risks and interdependencies to be managed. The notion 
of scope has been defined in different ways, or sometimes is not defined at all. Early scholars defined 
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it as the number of technologies or functional activities involved in collaboration (e.g., Zinn & 
Parasuraman, 1997). Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria (1998) consider relative scope to characterize the 
extent to which partners’ activities overlap and contribute to similar or asymmetric knowledge. It also 
has been used to characterize the extent to which innovative projects involve the creation of new 
technology rather than the application of existing technology (Sampson, 2004). Oxley & Sampson 
(2004) concentrate on what they call the most accessible dimension of alliance scope, in terms of 
conceptual clarity and data availability: its functional or vertical scope, reflecting the extent to which 
partners combine multiple and sequential value chain activities (e.g., R&D, manufacturing, marketing) 
within an alliance. This activity-based focus (or breadth) appears in Lioukas, Reuer, & Zollo (2016, p. 
167)’s work too, who note that “broad-scope alliances involve a large number of activities.” Some 
studies examine both breadth and depth of collaboration (e.g., Hora & Dutta, 2013), considering these 
as separate dimensions that describe the extensiveness and extent of concentration of the partnership. 
In contrast, other scholars consider the intensity of cooperation as part of scope (e.g., Trigo & Vence, 
2012; Zinn & Parasuraman, 1997), with the idea that a broad scope particularly provides a managerial 
problem when firms work intensively on a range of different activities.3 
For this study, we follow the latter conceptualization and define scope to capture both the breadth 
and depth of the collaboration. A broad scope implies diverse activities (such as R&D, logistics, 
production and marketing) are undertaken in the collaboration (Mishra et al., 2015; Zinn & 
Parasuraman, 1997). It relates to the choice of partner firms with which the focal firm can perform 
various value chain activities jointly, under the umbrella of the collaboration, or else in isolation 
(Lioukas et al., 2016). A deep scope corresponds to the intensity of the collaboration, linked to the 
extent to which the partners collaborate within each function or activity (Zinn & Parasuraman, 1997). 
Collaborations of greater scope (i.e., broader and deeper collaboration) are more complex to manage, 
because they involve dealing to a greater extent with both coordination and cooperation issues. 
Therefore, Mishra et al. (2015) highlight the need to investigate how firms design structures to ensure 
effective performance in collaborations of greater scope. Smith et al. (2014) also recognize that, 
                                                 
3 Dahlquist & Griffith (2017) also more broadly consider ‘collaborative magnitude’ that involves the breath of 
firms’ commitments complementary actions, and specific investments. 
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despite extensive research into cooperation, the inconsistent findings leave the nature of the link 
between scope and performance unclear. We thus formulate hypotheses to associate collaboration 
scope, control mechanisms, and firm performance, taking the basic position that collaborations of a 
greater scope provide a greater potential to enhance firm performance, but that the strength of this 
effect will depend on the control mechanisms relied upon. 
 
3. Hypothesis development 
3.1. The moderating effect of boundary spanners’ relational skills 
A crucial factor that can enhance cooperation and coordination between buyers and suppliers is the 
presence of socialization or relational processes (Cao & Lumineau, 2015). Such processes increase 
relationship quality, through improved information sharing, smoother problem solving, and restraints 
on unethical uses of power (Mahama, 2006). In accordance with social exchange theory and relational 
views (Dyer & Singh, 1998), researchers affirm positive effects of trust and relational norms (Liu et 
al., 2009), organizational virtuousness (Cameron, Leutscher, & Calarco, 2011), and relational 
governance (Wacker et al., 2016) on performance. Yet, the role of individual boundary spanners in 
buyer–supplier relationships, who are at the basis of relational controls, deserve greater attention 
(Tangpong et al., 2010). This holds particularly for the complex link between the relational qualities of 
boundary spanners and firm performance. Zhang et al. (2011) conceive of boundary spanning 
capabilities as facilitators of organizational trust; Tangpong et al. (2010) focus on the benefits of an 
interactionist perspective that combines organizational relational norms and individual agent 
cooperativeness to reduce opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships. In line with these 
contributions, we assume that relational skills of the partners’ boundary spanners can exert a direct 
positive effect on performance. Relational skills create “personal chemistry” (Taylor, 2005) between 
boundary spanners of both firms and help them formulate reciprocal expectations and enhance mutual 
adaptation. If unforeseen events arise, relational skills enable them to solve problems quickly and still 
achieve performance targets (Liu et al., 2009). However, the relative benefits of such relational skills 
in collaborative relationships of varying scope is less clear, and based on our review of the literature 
we develop two competing hypotheses on the interrelations with collaborative scope.  
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When the collaborative intensity of the relationship is greater, firms are exposed to greater risk, 
and more complex, larger transactions that entail greater risk also lead firms to rely on partners they 
consider more trustworthy and competent (Dekker et al., 2013, 2016). Because firm trustworthiness is 
favored by intense communications between boundary spanners who are readily available and capable 
of offering explanations (Zhang et al., 2011), the need for such qualitative interactions should increase 
with the scope of the collaboration. That is, these qualitative interactions should help boundary 
spanners coordinate, implement action plans, resolve problems or conflicts, explain their interests to 
each other, fairly share collaborative benefits, and prevent opportunistic behavior that would be even 
more harmful due to the intensity of the collaboration (Dekker et al., 2016; Tangpong et al., 2010). 
From this perspective, relational skills of partners’ boundary spanners should facilitate qualitative 
interactions between the boundary spanners of both sides, and thus, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1a. Boundary spanners’ relational skills positively moderate the relationship between collaboration 
scope and firm performance. 
A competing line of thought to the above results is in an opposite prediction. With an increasing 
scope, the number and intensity of activities included in the exchange increases, as does the number of 
boundary spanners involved in the interactions. To the extent that boundary spanners engage in 
different but interdependent tasks, their relational skills would be advantageous for ensuring 
coordination efforts. The activities span many different functions (e.g., purchasing, R&D, engineering, 
after sales service), however, each with specific task and goals, across partner organizations. 
Therefore, each boundary spanner likely exploits his or her relational skills to achieve the goals of the 
collaboration and his or her firm, even though inter-functional coordination (such as provided through 
inter-organizational controls as discussed below) is what is truly needed. This argument parallels Oliva 
and Watson’s (2011) point that in increasingly differentiated organizations, supply chain planning 
requires a broader cross-functional reach to realize integration. As Håkansson & Lind (2004) point 
out, in socially embedded networks, some employees interact and collaborate intensively with 
employees in the other company, to the extent that they might even form subgroups with distinct 
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cultures. In collaborations of extensive scope though, the presence of several local subgroups with 
distinct routines and relational norms could prove a barrier to effective coordination. More generally, 
when collaboration increases in scope, a greater degree of coordination and cooperation across 
functions and activities will be required, and relying on boundary spanner relational skills may be 
insufficient to realize such coordination. Consequently, the value of boundary spanners’ relational 
skills would be relatively greater in collaborations of narrow scope than in those of broad scope where 
inter-organizational controls may play a more prominent role. Accordingly, we provide an opposing 
hypothesis by anticipating a negative moderating effect of boundary spanners’ relational skills on the 
relationship between collaborative scope and firm performance. This negative moderating effect 
indicates that in collaborations of greater scope, the positive influence of boundary spanners’ relational 
skills will be weaker than in collaborations of limited scope. Thus, we predict as competing hypothesis 
to H1a that:  
 
H1b. Boundary spanners’ relational skills negatively moderate the relationship between collaboration 
scope and firm performance. 
 
3.2. The moderating effect of inter-organizational controls 
Control mechanisms within organizations aim at resolving three key problems (e.g., Bedford et al., 
2016): goal alignment (i.e., cooperation), adaptability, and integration (i.e., coordination). Inter-
organizational controls aim for similar objectives with a clear emphasis on cooperation and 
coordination requirements. For example, a formal contract grants firms legal safeguards and options 
for sanctioning uncooperative behaviors. It also allows each party, through the contracting process, to 
make its expectations and assumptions explicit, which should mitigate the risk of misunderstanding or 
mismatch (Lumineau & Henderson, 2012). Contractual mechanisms reduce opportunism and favor 
relationship performance (Dahlquist & Griffith, 2017; Liu et al., 2009); operational performance 
measurement systems enhance product quality, on-time delivery, and cost savings (Mahama, 2006); 
and organizational mechanisms such as target setting, operational reviews and feedback are associated 
with collaborative advantage, better quality relationships, and overall performance (Cao & Zhang, 
2011). Prior empirical findings thus lead us to assume that inter-organizational controls facilitate 
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performance. However, designing and implementing such controls is not a “context-free” process (Liu 
et al., 2009), and prior research indeed indicates that their use varies with characteristics of 
collaborative relationships that favor greater use of controls (e.g., Dekker et al., 2013, 2016). 
In collaborative relationships of limited scope, reliance on inter-organizational controls may 
remain limited as compared to larger scope collaboration (Zinn & Parasuraman, 1997). Narrow scope 
collaboration may also be well managed by partners’ boundary spanners, reducing the need for 
broader organizational control mechanisms. Direct interactions among boundary spanners enable 
proximity, and working closely together helps partner firms cooperate (Dekker et al., 2016). Thus, in 
this setting extensive (costly) inter-organizational controls may not be needed. In contrast, when 
controls pertain to a coordination context (larger scope collaborations), they provide a framework that 
can facilitate interactions, information sharing, adaptations, and integration. They give individual 
boundary spanners enhanced information, which can clarify task expectations, improve decision 
making, ensure a focus on organizational goals, respond to variations in the external environment, and 
enable better coordination (Bedford et al., 2016). This creates conditions for cross-functional 
integration to be realized (e.g., Oliva & Watson, 2011), also across organizational boundaries. For 
example, target-setting and feedback processes create space for interactions that enable boundary 
spanners to learn about the expertise and expectations of their partner, establish standardized 
communication and routines, and ensure coherence across organizations. Therefore, when the 
collaboration scope increases, inter-organizational controls can effectively facilitate coordination 
processes across the different activities undertaken. We thus propose: 
 
H2. Use of inter-organizational controls positively moderates the relationship between collaboration 
scope and firm performance. 
 
3.3. Interrelationships between boundary spanner relational skills and inter-organizational controls  
While the prior hypotheses predict how boundary spanner relational skills and inter-
organizational controls moderate the effects of collaboration scope on firm performance, they may 
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also interact in the management of the relationship and influencing performance.4 For instance, 
boundary spanners often are involved in the implementation and execution of inter-organizational 
controls (e.g., by taking part in target setting, evaluation and feedback meetings). This provides a 
connection between the individual or ‘micro-level’ and organizational level mechanisms used to 
achieve control and integration (cf. Oliva & Watson, 2011). Greater relational skills may enhance the 
effectiveness of inter-organizational controls, for instance, through achieving better quality targets and 
feedback on performance. Relational skills can also help overcoming the limits of inter-organizational 
controls and to attain a mutually acceptable resolution of conflicts when they occur. At the same time, 
inter-organizational controls can provide the opportunity for boundary spanners to reveal and activate 
their relational skills. These effects would result in a positive interrelation between the mechanisms. 
However, inter-organizational controls (e.g., targets, evaluation, feedback and structures) that involve 
more formalization and involvement of more participants from both partner firms may also limit 
boundary spanners in effectively using their skills and limit their influence in managing the 
relationship. Enhanced relational skills of a partner’s boundaries spanners may also lead firms to 
invest less in costly organizational controls if these would be seen as redundant or even counter-
productive. These effects would result in a negative interrelation between the mechanisms. 
While these arguments provide tension to the interrelationship of the two mechanisms, we 
follow the argument that high-skilled boundary spanners can enhance the effectiveness of inter-
organizational controls and vice versa. This expectation is in line with the broader finding in the 
literature that formal governance is positively related to relational governance (Cao & Lumineau, 
2015). Thus, we predict a positive interaction on performance: 
 
H3. Boundary spanners’ relational skills and inter-organizational controls are positively interrelated in 
influencing firm performance. 
 
Prior research indicates that the interrelationship between relational and formal governance 
mechanisms can vary across different contexts (Cao & Lumineau, 2015). In line with this and the prior 
                                                 
4 More generally, studies have examined complementary and substitutive relationships between relational and 
formal controls (Dahlquist & Griffith, 2017; Huang et al., 2014). 
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hypotheses, we expect the two mechanisms and their interrelationship to become of greater importance 
with greater relationship scope. Accordingly, we examine in the empirical tests both the interaction of 
the two mechanisms as well as their interaction with collaboration scope to assess if, how and when 
they interrelate.  
Figure 1 summarizes the conceptual model and hypotheses developed to be tested. 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical model 
 
 
4. Methods 
4.1.  Data collection 
In order to test our hypotheses, data were obtained via the European Center for Enterprise and 
Innovation (THESAME) and its Think Tank PEAK®5, which functions to support the development 
and promotion of collaborative relationships in supply chains. A web-based survey invitation was sent 
to a sample of 2,000 French buyer and supplier firms in the French Auvergne Rhône-Alpes region; the 
second largest region after Paris in terms of Gross Domestic Product, and the 8th in Europe. Restricting 
the geographical area of the data collect is a common practice to ensure homogeneous conditions of 
the survey (e.g., Niskanen & Niskanen, 2010), which decreases the potential effects of extraneous 
variables. 
An email that detailed the objectives of the study was sent to each firm’s CEO. In the invitation, 
CEOs were asked to forward the questionnaire to the most qualified boundary spanner in their 
                                                 
5 PEAK stands for Purchasing European Alliance for Knowledge. The survey was prepared and sent out by an 
independent firm, Socrates (http://socratesonline.com/), on behalf of PEAK. 
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organization, who could evaluate an on-going, important collaboration with the firm’s main supplier 
or customer. This request was to ensure that the survey would be completed and returned only by well-
informed key respondents. This process and the focus on a strategic partner echoes the methodology 
followed by Zhao, Huo, Selen, & Yeung (2011), who suggest it is an adequate way to study 
collaborative supply chain issues. Knowing that both customer and supplier firms would be sampled, 
the questions were formulated by PEAK sufficiently broad to be relevant for both parties.6 In the 
analysis we, however, also include the position of the responding firm to control for potential 
differences in relationships between constructs. 
After two reminder messages, 232 responses were received (11.6% response rate), of which 200 
were usable and without any missing data, resulting in an effective response rate of 10%. Compared 
with prior online supply chain collaboration studies (e.g., Cao & Zhang, 2011; Narayanan, 
Narasimhan, & Schoenherr, 2015), and given the nature of the process that asked CEOs to forward the 
survey, this rate is satisfactory. In line with the request to forward the survey to the most qualified 
respondent, the majority of CEOs did not complete the survey themselves (those that did typically 
worked at smaller firms), and job titles of most respondents related to purchasing manager or officer 
(for buyers), and key account managers (for suppliers). Table 1 contains details about the sample 
characteristics. 
 
  
                                                 
6 For instance, in the measurement of performance derived from the collaboration, both buyers and suppliers are 
concerned about margins, delivery, quality, innovation and the development of competencies. To assess 
measurement similarity across the two groups, we also ran the factor analyses reported in Table 2 separately for 
buyers and suppliers, and obtained similar results in terms of factor structures and item loadings. 
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Table 1: Sample characteristics 
Variables (n=200)
Firm size  
small (10-249 employees) 20.5% 
medium (250-4.999 employees) 29.0% 
large (>5.000 employees) 50.5% 
Firm position in the supply chain* 
Supplier firms 37% 
Buyer firms 63% 
Length of the relationship (12.56 years average) 
0-5 years 10.5% 
5-15 years 26.5% 
More than 15 years 63% 
Respondent experience in relationship (5.89 years average) 
0 to 4 years 53.5% 
5 to 15 years 30.5 
More than 10 years  16% 
Respondent job title / company position  
CEO / President / General Director 11% 
Manager of buyer-supplier relationship 74% 
Purchaser / key account manager 12% 
Other 3% 
Industry  
Manufacturing 83.2% 
Service 16.8% 
* Firm position (supplier or buyer) was considered in reference to the firm’s status with its main 
partner as reflected on in the survey. 
 
4.2. Common method bias 
The survey data for this study were collected from the most qualified respondent in the 
organization. This focus on the best informed respondent can reduce concerns about common method 
bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). In addition, the procedures and statistical tests 
recommended by Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven (2006) were used to mitigate this risk. The first 
procedural remedy aims to reduce respondents’ tendency to offer socially desirable responses or 
acquiesce when crafting their responses; specifically, the respondents’ anonymity was carefully 
protected (Podsakoff et al., 2003), which was noted on the introductory web page of the online survey. 
Second, to minimize item ambiguity (Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000), a pre-test of the survey 
was conducted in order to adjust or replace any ambiguous questions. Third, after obtaining the data 
we conducted Harman’s one-factor test, which is based on the idea that substantial common method 
bias exists if a single or general factor accounts for most of the variance when all the variables are 
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entered together (Podsakoff et al., 2003). We ran an unrotated principal component analysis on all the 
measurement items used in the model. Four factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than 1, 
suggesting that common method bias is not a problem. Finally, we comment that even if some 
common method bias is present, this is unlikely to increase the likelihood of finding evidence for our 
hypotheses as these require estimating interactions between constructs which cannot be artefacts of 
such bias (Siemsen, Roth, & Oliveira, 2010).  
 
4.3. Variable measurement 
As described in more detail below, we relied on prior studies to select from the survey 
measurement scales for the key constructs included in our hypotheses. Since for each construct 
multiple items are used for measurement, we used maximum likelihood (ML) factor analysis to 
evaluate construct measurement.7 For each construct, the results confirm a one-factor solution, and 
Cronbach Alpha values indicate adequate reliability. We then created summated scales for each 
construct to be used for the hypothesis tests. This procedure has two specific benefits. First, it provides 
a means to overcome measurement error, at least to some extent. By using average or typical 
responses to a set of related variables, we reduce the measurement error that might occur for single 
questions. Second, it represents multiple aspects of a concept in a single measure (Hair, Black, Babin, 
& Anderson, 2014). Table 2 reports all measures. 
 
4.3.1. Independent variable 
Following Mishra et al. (2015), the scope of the collaboration was measured by capturing the 
depth and breadth of the collaboration on five value chain activities: R&D, logistics, production, 
marketing/distribution, and after-sales (see also Dekker et al., 2016). Respondents indicated the 
intensity of collaboration on each activity (captured on a 10-point Likert scale). We take the mean of 
the sum of scores to create a measure of the scope of the collaboration (SCOPE). The Cronbach alpha 
value (.882) indicates adequate reliability and ML factor analysis (variance explained 68.10%) affirms 
the unidimensionality of the construct with high loadings and test scores (KMO = .842; Bartlett’s test 
                                                 
7 Survey items were related to prior studies, but no existing scales were used for measurement. Therefore, we use 
exploratory factor analysis to assess measurement properties of scales.  
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χ2 = 318.35, df = 10, p = .000). We used one other item in the questionnaire, which asked for a global 
perception of the degree of collaboration (from 1 to 10), to conduct an additional validity test. The 
positive correlation (r = .49, p < .01) supports the idea that a greater scope of the collaboration is also 
associated with a perception of more intensive collaboration. 
 
4.3.2. Moderating variables 
The boundary spanners’ relational skills (BSRS) construct reflects the relational behavior of the 
people in charge of the relationship (Zhang et al., 2011). As indicated, we focus on the partner’s 
boundary spanners, as the development of relational controls essentially depends on the business 
partner’s boundary spanners. An additional benefit of this measurement is that it avoids judgment and 
perception bias towards the boundary spanner’s own relational skills (since the firm’s boundary 
spanner is the respondent). We used six items from the survey that pertain to the informant’s judgment 
of the abilities of the partner’s boundary spanners to: (1) help the firm move forward, (2) help the firm 
develop competencies, (3) explain and justify their decisions, (4) be reliable, (5) be transparent in their 
dealings, and (6) exhibit solidarity in case of difficulties. These items relate most closely to the 
relational skills as reviewed in the theory section and specifically relate to how the partner firm’s 
boundary spanners interact with and influence the focal firm.8 In particular, the question addresses 
boundary spanners’ exposed abilities to engage in relational behaviors that support development of 
relational control. Each item used a 10-point Likert scale (1 = "Strongly disagree" to 10 = "Totally 
agree"). The Cronbach alpha value (.915) indicates high reliability, and ML factor analysis (variance 
explained 64.47%) affirms the unidimensionality of the construct with high loadings and adequate test 
scores (KMO = .895; Bartlett’s test χ2 = 789.08, df = 15, p = .000). Similar to the assessment of 
SCOPE, we used additional variables to conduct validity tests, which items relate to key relational 
control mechanisms (Cao & Lumineau, 2015). First, the positive correlation with an item evaluating 
                                                 
8 These items align well with similar measures used by Cameron et al. (2011). We recognize that the six items 
used to measure the construct do not fully cover the span of skill identified in the literature section. The survey 
included several other items about broader characteristics or ‘virtuous’ of partners’ boundary spanners. We only 
selected those items that directly assessed how the partner’s boundary spanners interact with and influence the 
focal firm as this is key to how relational skills are assessed in the specific relationship. Adding to the construct 
measurement two more general items about the boundary spanners’ (1) competence to manage the relationship, 
and (2) initiatives to maintain and improve the relationship, provides similar results as reported. 
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the level of trust with the partner firm confirms the idea that boundary spanners’ relational skills create 
the conditions for trust to develop (r = .81; p < .01). Second, the measure correlates positively with an 
item that captures how the climate of the relationship allows to adequately handle conflicts (r = .75; p 
= .000), again providing evidence of construct validity. 
The inter-organizational control (IOC) construct consists of four survey items, which stem from 
commonly used measures in interfirm control research of control mechanisms that support on-going 
collaboration (Dekker et al., 2013; Draulans, deMan, & Volberda, 2003). The first item captured the 
extent to which the relationship was based on joint targets (Jap, 1999), which set the performance 
expectations for partners to be realized. The second item captures use of feedback meetings to evaluate 
satisfaction regarding partners’ relationship expectations, which enables to assess and discuss 
performance on the joint targets set, and to agree on adjustments if necessary. The third item captures 
use of follow-up meetings on common projects, which allows for monitoring progress of and 
coordination about joint activities undertaken. The last item captures the use of mechanisms that foster 
joint action such as seminars with suppliers and joint training. Each item used a 10-point Likert scale 
(for the first item: 1 = "Strongly disagree" to 10 = "Totally agree"; for the other items: 1 = "Never" to 
10 = "Systematically"). The Cronbach alpha value (.706) is lower than for the BSRS construct but still 
indicates acceptable reliability, and ML factor analysis (variance explained 54.27%) affirms the 
unidimensionality of the construct with high loadings and test scores (KMO = .719; Bartlett’s test χ2 = 
152.76, df = 6, p = .000).9 As additional validity test, we correlated the construct with an item 
pertaining to establishing a shared IT system with the partner. Managing common activities through 
shared IT systems signals organizational commitment and investments in collaboration, and indeed the 
correlation is positive and significant (r = .30, p < .01). 
 
4.3.3. Dependent variable 
We assessed economic, operational, and strategic dimensions of performance (PERF) with five 
survey items measured on a 10-point Likert-type scale (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 10 = “Strongly 
agree”). Respondents specifically evaluated how the collaboration benefits the firm’s overall 
                                                 
9 We note that the differences in reliability of the BSRS and IOC constructs can generate differences in the 
power to detect direct and moderating influences on performance. 
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performance by enabling it to improve on-time delivery and quality of the products and services that it 
offers (Mahama, 2006), innovate (Griffith & Zhao, 2015), develop firm competencies (Li et al., 2010), 
and maximize margins (Sedatole, Vrettos, & Widener, 2012).10 Similar to prior studies on the 
performance effects of supply chain relationships, this construct captures both financial and non-
financial elements of performance. The Cronbach alpha value (.898) indicates high reliability, and ML 
factor analysis (variance explained 71.51%) affirms the unidimensionality of the construct with high 
loadings and test scores (KMO =.854; Bartlett’s test χ2 = 565.18, df = 10, p = .000). The high factor 
loadings of both the financial and non-financial performance items indicate these elements are strongly 
related. We conduct construct validity tests using two additional survey items that asked for an overall 
evaluation of the relationship with the partner in terms of mutual benefits and the firm’s achievement 
of expectations (Li et al., 2010). The respective correlations with PERF (r = .71, p < .01; r = .74; p < 
.01) confirm that better performance derived from the collaboration is associated with a more positive 
evaluation of these aspects. 
 
  
                                                 
10 A sixth survey item about performance impact captured how the collaboration influenced the management of 
joint projects. As this item did not relate to firm performance, we excluded it from construct measurement. 
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Table 2: Measurement scales and descriptive statistics  
Construct and measurement items Means (SD)  
Loading 
(variance 
explained) 
Cronbach 
alpha 
SCOPE Extent of collaboration on value chain activities  (68.10%) .882 
R&D 6.86 (2.08) .697  
Logistics 6.93 (2.29) .878  
Production 6.95 (2.02) .826  
Marketing/distribution 6.11 (2.55) .849  
After-sales 6.09 (2.48) .849  
IOC Inter-organizational controls  (54.27%) .706 
Joint targets  7.02 (1.96) .775  
Follow-up meetings on common projects 8.23 (1.62) .744  
Feedback meetings to evaluate relationship expectations 7.58 (2.02) .778  
Mechanisms to foster joint action (e.g. joint seminars, 
training)  6.23 (2.31) .641 
 
BSRS Boundary spanner relational skills  (70.35%) .915 
Help us move forward 6.87 (1.94) .857  
Help us develop our competencies 6.44 (2.13) .856  
Explain and justify their decisions 7.05 (1.84) .794  
Are reliable 7.71 (1.75) .819  
Are transparent in dealings 6.76 (2.04) .825  
Show solidarity in case of difficulties 7.15 (2.01) .879  
PERF Performance  (71.51%) .898 
The collaboration allows to    
…improve on-time delivery 7.26 (1.86) .889  
…improve quality of the offers 6.69 (1.90) .848  
…innovate 5.56 (2.26) .837  
…develop competencies  6.77 (1.87) .830  
…maximize margins 6.42 (2.08) .822  
4.3.4. Control variables 
We control for firm size, as captured by the number of employees. Three groups distinguished in 
the survey capture small (10–249 employees), medium (250–4999), and large (+5000) firms. Firm size 
can influence collaborative scope, as resource constraints can inhibit smaller firms engage in 
collaborations of greater scope. Following prior research on relational controls in buyer–supplier 
collaborations, we also control for the age of the relationship (Doney & Cannon, 1997), as this can 
influence perceptions of such controls and its performance. We capture Age as the logarithm of the 
number of years since the beginning of the relationship. We also control for the experience of the 
respondent in the relationship (Experience) captured by the logarithm of the number of years of 
personal involvement. More experienced respondents may have better knowledge of the relationship, 
but could also have different views on the influence of relational skills of partners’ boundary spanners 
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that they have been exposed to longer. Perceptions of performance can differ based on the firm’s 
position in the supply chain (Ambrose, Marshall, & Lynch, 2010), and partner dependencies (Mishra, 
Sharma, Kumar, & Dubey, 2016). Therefore, we control for the firm’s position in the supply chain (0 
= supplier, 1 = buyer) and for the dependencies between the firms as captured by the difficulty of 
replacing the partner (Firm dependence), and the difficulty of being replaced by the partner (Partner 
dependence) (Li et al., 2010). Finally, we control for firms’ industry participation by differentiating 
between firms active in service industries (0) versus manufacturing industries (1). 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics and variable correlations, as well as the square root of the 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) of the multi-item constructs. The variable correlations suggest that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a concern, and indeed variance inflation factors of our regression 
analyses are all below 2, reinforcing this conclusion. For each multi-item construct, the diagonal on 
Table 3 shows that the square root of the AVE is greater than its correlations with the other model 
variables, supporting discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
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Table 3 – Construct means, standard deviations, and correlations  
Variables Mean sd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. SCOPE 5.59 2.10 .822     
2. IOC 7.26 1.45 .407*** .737         
3. BSRS 6.99 1.64 .431*** .684*** .839        
4. PERF 6.54 1.69 .505*** .668*** .780*** .846     
5. Firm size 2.30 0.78 .167** .164** .016 .050 -      
6. Relationship age  2.45 0.46 .043 -.048 -.018 -.018 .166** -     
7. Experience 1.55 0.63 -.018 -.077 .091 -.017 -.446*** .250*** -    
8. Firm position 0.63 0.48 .152** .098 -.026 .068 .476*** .034 -.423*** -   
9. Firm dependence 6.02 2.15 .135* .175** .204*** .159** .043 .074 -.070 .062 -  
10. Partner dependence 5.89 2.14 .143** .173** .166** .190*** -.124* .150** .231*** -.222*** .348*** - 
The diagonal reports the square root of the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) of multi-item constructs, and the off-diagonal coefficients are Pearson correlations. 
***, **, * indicate that correlations are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level (two-tailed), respectively.  
25 
 
5. Results 
We followed the process regression procedure for SPSS (Hayes, 2018) to examine each 
hypothesis and analyze the moderating effects using a pick-a-point approach for each interaction term, 
with a bootstrap analysis with 5,000 replications. In the procedure, variables are mean-centered before 
calculating the interaction terms and being entered into the analysis. 
Table 4 reports the results of the model estimations, and Figure 2 provides a graphical 
representation of the main results. Model 1 in Table 4 first presents the moderating effects of the two 
control mechanisms on the effects of collaboration scope, and Model 2 adds the interaction between 
them, as well as the three-way interaction with collaboration scope. As the estimations show, 
consistent with expectations, collaboration scope relates positively to performance (p < .01). This 
supports the idea that collaborations that involve a greater number of value chain activities, which 
partners collaborate on more intensively, provide firms greater potential to benefit in terms of 
enhanced delivery, quality, competence development, innovation, and profit margins. More extensive 
collaborations thus create the conditions for positive returns. Second, inter-organizational controls, 
which include joint targets, follow-up meetings, feedback reviews, and arrangements that foster joint 
action, are positively associated with firm performance derived from collaboration (p < .01). Similarly, 
the presence of boundary spanners with high levels of relational skills relates positively to firm 
performance (p < .01). These significant direct effects confirm that more successful supply chain 
relationships are characterized by a greater presence of inter-organizational controls as well as skilled 
boundary spanners involved in managing the relationship. 
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Table 4: Model estimations and hypothesis tests   
     Model 1     Model 2 
   95% conf.                 95% conf 
 ß p t-value Lower Upper ß p t-value Lower Upper 
Constant 6.954 .000 14.152 5.785 8.085 6.937 .000 13.906 5.755 8.043 
SCOPE .136 .001 3.924 .053 .222 .138 .002 3.084 .044 .238 
IOC .418 .000 4.010 .213 .637 .422 .000 3.958 .208 .632 
BSRS .895 .000 8.360 .678 1.108 .908 .000 8.021 .673 1.130 
SCOPE*BSRS -.099 .039 -2.083 -.190 -.003 -.110 .040 -2.065 -.222 -.006 
SCOPE*IOC .113 .015 2.449 .009 .209 .109 .025 2.266 .000 .202 
BSRS*IOC      .040 .631 .481 -.100 .237 
SCOPE*BSRS*IOC      .000 .991 -.012 -.043 .051 
           
Firm size -.173 .120 -1.563 -.459 .098 -.178 .116 -1.578 -.481 .097 
Relationship age .131 .459 .7419 -.281 .535 .135 .450 .757 -.264 .559 
Experience -.290 .213 -2.035 -.130 .047 -.046 .202 -1.280 -.137 .042 
Firm position .170 .056 .977 -.016 .157 .072 .068 1.835 -.016 .155 
Firm dependence -.044 .043 -1.250 -.601 .023 -.286 .049 -1.984 -.585 .019 
Partner dependence .074 .330 1.921 -.182 .516 .189 .298 1.043 -.176 .571 
Industry -.197 .365 -.908 -.651 .287 -.188 .391 -.859 -.656 .312 
R2 .69     .69     
F value 34.751     29.530     
Reported coefficients are standardized coefficient (ß).  
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Figure 2: Empirical results 
 
 
 
***p<0.01 ; ** p<0.05.   
 
Regarding the hypotheses, the findings provide evidence in support of H1b that predicts a negative 
moderating effect of BSRS on the relationship between scope and performance The negative 
coefficient (ß = -.110, p < .05) indicates that the positive influence of boundary spanners’ relational 
skills decreases when the scope of the supply chain collaboration increases. H2 is corroborated as 
inter-organizational controls positively influence the association between collaborative scope and 
performance (ß = .109, p < .05).11 This supports the idea that inter-organizational controls are 
particularly valuable in collaborations of greater scope, where the more intense collaboration across 
multiple activities demands a greater ability to coordinate and control than reliance on skilled 
boundary spanners could provide. Instead, in such settings characterized by greater complexity, 
practices (such as targets, joint meetings, feedback) to foster joint action can enhance relationship 
management. 
The results of Model 2 further show that the two- and three-way interactions between BSRS and 
IOCs, and between SCOPE, BSRS and IOCs are not significant. This suggests there are no additional 
(conditional) interrelationships between the two control mechanisms, or that the competing effects 
identified in developing H3 cancel each other out. Thus, we conclude there is no clear evidence in 
favor of H3. Regarding the control variables, we observe a marginally significant effect of firm 
position (p < .10), with buyers reporting on average more favorable performance outcomes of their 
                                                 
11 We note again that particularly the moderating effects of IOC may be attenuated due to its lower measurement 
reliability (α=.706) relative to the BSRS construct (α=.915). 
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reported relationships with suppliers than suppliers indicated for their relationships with buyers. 
Additionally, firm dependence shows a negative coefficient on performance (p < .05), indicating that 
more dependent firms are less able to extract value from their supplier chain relationships. Overall, the 
model estimations indicate that the influence of collaborative scope on firm performance varies in 
different ways with both boundary spanners’ relational skills and inter-organizational controls, while 
there is no evidence of additional interactions between these mechanisms. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
6.1. Theoretical implications 
Motivated by commentary that the way that in interfirm relations inter-individual trust and shared 
norms transfer to the organizational level is far from self-evident (Tangpong et al., 2010; Zaheer et al., 
1998), we examine the performance effects of boundary spanners’ relational skills. Particularly, we are 
interested in the conditions under which such relational skills, which are at the basis of relational 
controls between firms, are most beneficial for effective relationship management, and when use of 
(more costly) inter-organizational controls is desirable. Our survey data support the belief that both 
boundary spanners’ relational skills and inter-organizational controls can contribute to the 
performance effects derived from interfirm collaboration. However, as the scope of the collaboration 
increases in terms of diversity and intensity of activities jointly conducted, the marginal impact of 
boundary spanners’ relational kills decreases. Thus, reliance on the relational skills of a business 
partners’ boundary spanners may not be sufficient when there is a need to manage and coordinate 
increasingly complex collaboration, and which benefits from an increasing use of inter-organizational 
controls. This is not to say that skilled boundary spanners would be favored less in complex 
collaborations; instead, in this setting, their positive impact reduces, which reduction can be 
compensated by greater reliance on inter-organizational controls that allow firms better to align 
interests, coordinate and adjust when necessary. In the debate on the costs and benefits of controls for 
supporting effective supply chain relations, these findings also suggest that, in the presence of highly 
skilled individuals, narrow scope collaboration may do well with limited reliance on inter-
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organizational controls, until it grows in scope and complexity which changes the cost-benefit tradeoff 
for these controls.  
This study aims to make three main contributions to the literature. First, we focus on the key role 
of boundary spanners in buyer–supplier relationships and how their relational skills contribute to the 
effective management of these relationships. We compare the performance-impact of boundary 
spanner relational skills with that of inter-organizational controls, which prior literature has 
emphasized more, to address the question under which conditions reliance on these elements is most 
beneficial. Particularly, we show that the returns to relational skills of a business partner’s boundary 
spanners are greater in narrow-scope collaborations, while inter-organizational controls particularly 
help enhancing the benefits derived from collaboration of greater scope. Our findings thus indicate 
when boundary spanners relational skills can help offsetting investment in costly inter-organizational 
controls. They further indicate when the value of such control investments increases, which is when 
the greater scope of a relationship makes it too complex to rely primarily on the relational skills of 
dedicated individuals. 
Second, most studies on formal and informal modes of inter-organizational control adopt an 
organizational-level view, with a blurred frontier for measuring trust and relational norms. We instead 
provide a mixed-level of analysis, accounting for the boundary spanner level, which is the foundation 
for developing relational control between partners, as well as the organizational level (inter-
organizational controls). With our mixed-level analysis, we address the interplay between 
organizational mechanisms and “relational governance” on both organizational and individual levels, 
which are intricate and tightly linked. While scholars have debated the interrelationships between such 
controls (see Cao & Lumineau, 2015), we shift the focus to the conditions under which these 
mechanisms contribute to enhanced performance (Lumineau & Henderson, 2012). 
Third and related to this, we provide new insights into when reliance on the relational skills op 
business partners’ boundary spanners or inter-organizational controls contributes to performance. Prior 
research has considered factors such as the length or type of relationship. We instead consider its 
scope, which prior research has found to create demands for interfirm controls that can mitigate 
performance risks by facilitating coordination and mutual adaptation (Dekker et al., 2016). To the best 
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of our knowledge though, no prior empirical research has analyzed these elements of collaboration 
scope, boundary spanner relational skills and inter-organizational controls in conjunction. Our findings 
contribute a nuanced perspective on social exchange perspectives and relational views of interfirm 
relationships (Dyer & Singh, 1998), by indicating that relational skills may limit the need for more 
formal controls in particular when such skills of individuals are sufficient to deal with the complexity 
of the relationship. This changes, however, when complexity rises to a point where relational skills 
themselves are no longer sufficient and more formal controls are needed to delimit, formalize and 
coordinate the numerous interactions. This result is in line with arguments that collaborative 
relationships of greater scope can become complex and difficult to manage, such that they require 
more coordination through formal controls that allow firms to harmonize processes linked to the 
various interactions and effectively execute collaborative tasks (Dekker et al., 2016; Mishra et al., 
2015; Narayanan et al., 2015). 
 
6.2. Managerial implications 
Overall, our findings highlight the value of boundary spanner relational skills and inter-
organizational controls in supply chain relationships. For managers, in understanding how these 
elements contribute to interfirm control and performance, it is imperative to understand the nature of 
the relationship within which they are deployed. While both may contribute to enhancing the benefits 
derived from interfirm collaboration, the extent to which they do critically depends on the scope of the 
collaboration. Therefore, managers seeking for ways to improve the performance effects of 
collaboration can do so by paying close attention to these choices throughout the alliance management 
process. Relying on a partner’s skilled boundary spanners can be the low cost solution, as this can 
avoid – at least in part – the often high costs of formal controls, and may generate sufficient control 
particularly in narrow scope collaborations. However, to achieve effective collaboration this also 
implies a need for the focal firm to be cautious in selection for and placing within the relationship 
boundary spanners who possess similar skills and maintain similar values.  
Our results also indicate that managers’ choices to invest in inter-organizational controls such as 
target setting, monitoring and evaluation processes, and socialization mechanisms like joint seminars 
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and training, can become of increasing importance when collaboration scope is expanding. While in 
this case skilled boundary spanners are obviously still valuable, our results indicate that their favorable 
influence on performance decreases, while the use of inter-organizational controls enhances 
performance. For managers, this result also implies that, in considering how and how much 
(constrained) resources to dedicate to a relationship, it is critical to consider its characteristics relative 
to those of other ones in their portfolio. This requires not only considering and contrasting its strategic 
importance to the firm, but also its scope and associated complexity that place demands on controls. 
Given that larger firms often maintain a considerable number of relationships with external 
organizations, this can be a non-trivial though important managerial task.  
 
6.3. Limitations and suggestions for further research 
As in any study, this study is subject to several limitations, especially in relation to the available 
data, which requires some caution in assessing the results. Our sample is based on the French 
Auvergne Rhône-Alpes region, which features extensive industrial activity and innovativeness; as a 
result, our findings might not generalize to other regions with different industrial characteristics. 
Further studies with larger samples also could reveal the impact of other contingency factors than 
collaboration scope, such as whether an industry is technology intensive, emergent or traditional, 
hierarchical, or marked by strict vertical relationships (e.g., automotive, defense). Similarly, studies 
could incorporate other characteristics of relationships that capture risks and thus the need for control, 
such as asset specificity, uncertainty, transaction frequency, and task interdependencies (Anderson et 
al., 2015). 
In examining relational skills, we focus on the boundary spanners of the exchange partner, as they 
form the basis for the joint development of relational controls. A more complete view of relational 
skills and the development of trust and relational norms, however, could be obtained by also 
incorporating the firm’s own boundary spanners. And while we focus on relational skills that are 
oriented towards fruitful collaboration, a broader assessment of boundary spanners skills could also 
incorporate those skills that enable them to extract value from the relationship and partner. Although 
our study emphasizes the value and benefits of relational behavior derived from enhanced relational 
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skills, a broader conceptualization could also point to risks of collaborating with highly skilled 
counterparties (who may also be skilled in value appropriation), and the additional controls that may 
be required in such settings to maintain a mutually beneficial relationship. A related limitation stems 
from the available survey measures. Our measure of relational skills covers most underlying individual 
virtues that support good cooperation and specifically capture boundary spanners’ ability to engage in 
relational behaviors related to interaction and communication with the focal firm. However, a more 
comprehensive measure of inter-organizational controls might encompass additional elements, 
including those related to contractual and formal aspects. This could facilitate analyses of different 
types of controls (e.g., contractual and organizational, or outcome and behavior based), and their use 
and impacts across different stages of the relationship (e.g., initial vs. the ongoing relationship). 
Similarly, the measurement of firm performance could be extended, including more dimensions of 
particularly financial (e.g., cost, revenue) but also non-financial performance, as well as objective 
measurements of those dimensions. Finally, concerns may arise when examining effects on (self-
reported) firm performance, as the estimates by responsible boundary spanners may to some extent 
suffer from respondent bias, common method bias and survival bias (e.g., high performing 
relationships with skilled boundary spanners and adequate controls are more likely to survive, 
affecting the correlation between these factors). In the data collection procedures, precautions were 
taken aimed at avoiding respondent and common method bias, and the nature of our research question 
required examination of existing relationships. However, even if these potential sources of bias would 
affect the estimated direct effects, it is unlikely that our hypothesis tests suffer from them since 
estimated moderation effects would not be systematically influenced by such bias (Siemsen et al., 
2010). 
Despite these limitations, our arguments and empirical findings add to our understanding of when 
and how boundary spanners’ relational skills and inter-organizational controls contribute to the 
benefits derived from interfirm collaboration. With our findings, we extend previous work on the 
control of interfirm relationships, as well as on the partnership characteristics that are relevant in 
understanding the performance impact of the mix of control choices that firms make. Despite their 
frequency in industrial life, there is yet much to be learned about buyer–supplier relationships and 
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their control. The rapid evolution of technologies and newly emerging industrial fields will likely 
make these questions of even greater importance; e.g., modes of control need to adapt to changing 
balances of power, especially if contractors experience increasing dependence on major equipment 
manufacturers or suppliers. Because negotiation behavior and power issues among organizations are 
fundamental forms of social interaction and exchange that are essentially located with the individuals 
acting at the boundaries of organizations, we hope the current research opens the way for future 
research in this important field. 
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